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Abstract—This paper studies the vulnerability of large-scale
power systems to false data injection (FDI) attacks through
their physical consequences. Prior work has shown that an
attacker-defender bi-level linear program (ADBLP) can be used
to determine the worst-case consequences of FDI attacks aiming
to maximize the physical power flow on a target line. This
ADBLP can be transformed into a single-level mixed-integer
linear program, but it is hard to solve on large power systems
due to numerical difficulties. In this paper, four computationally
efficient algorithms are presented to solve the attack optimization
problem on large power systems. These algorithms are applied on
the IEEE 118-bus system and the Polish system with 2383 buses
to conduct vulnerability assessments, and they provide feasible
attacks that cause line overflows, as well as upper bounds on the
maximal power flow resulting from any attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
The efficiency and intelligence of modern electric power
systems are increasing rapidly with integration of real-time
monitoring, sensing, communication and data processing. This
integration is accomplished via a cyber layer consisting of
the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system
in conjunction with the energy management system (EMS).
SCADA monitors the physical system, collects measurements,
and sends them to control center. In the EMS, state estimation
(SE) estimates the system operating states (voltage magnitudes
and angles) from measurements. This estimate along with the
subsequent data processing, optimization and communication,
including optimal power flow (OPF), allow for real-time
control of the power systems.
However, the integration of the cyber layer also increases
the threat of cyber-attacks on power systems that could lead
to severe physical consequences, as illustrated by the recent
cyber-attack in Ukraine (see [1]). Therefore, it is crucial to
develop techniques to detect and thwart potential attacks,
which requires evaluating system vulnerability to credible at-
tacks. Assessing consequences of possible attacks is extremely
instructive for system operators, and is important for secure
power system operations.
This paper focuses on false data injection (FDI) attacks,
wherein a malicious attacker replaces a subset of SCADA
measurements (power flows and injections) with counterfeits.
FDI attacks can be designed to target system states [2]–[4],
system topology [5], [6], and energy markets [7]. Optimization
problems have been proposed to design FDI attacks that aim
to maximize line power flow [8], change locational marginal
prices [9], or maximize operating cost [10], [11]. However, the
results have only been demonstrated for small systems. In this
paper, we focus on the worst-case FDI attack that causes line
overflow as in [8], but our goal is to evaluate vulnerability of
significantly larger systems (i.e. thousands of buses).
The authors of [8] introduce an FDI attack that re-distributes
the loads by changing SCADA measurements, to trigger gener-
ation re-dispatches that result in physical overflow on a target
line. The authors show that the worst-case attack can be found
using an attacker-defender bi-level linear program (ADBLP),
wherein the first level models the attacker’s objective and
limitations, and the second level models the system response
through OPF. Techniques to solve ADBLPs with applications
to power systems have been studied in [11], [12], but are
limited to scenarios with the same objective for both levels,
and hence, their techniques cannot be applied to either the
problem in [8] or its generalization considered here for large
power systems. An ADBLP can be reformulated as a mathe-
matical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) [13] by
replacing the second level by its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions. However, MPECs are non-convex and hard to solve
efficiently in general [14]. Many heuristics have been applied
to MPECs involving reformulations and relaxations [15]–[17],
but they typically require non-linear programs and/or pro-
prietary solvers. Moreover, they do not guarantee optimality,
convergence, nor speed. We have attempted to apply existing
techniques to the MPEC resulting from the ADBLP in [8]
including the SNOPT [18] solver with Matlab interface, but
in our experiments they failed to produce good solutions even
for small sized systems. The MPEC from the ADBLP in [8]
can be further reformulated as a mixed-integer linear program
(MILP) by rewriting the complementary slackness constraints
as mixed-integer constraints. As the system size increases, this
MILP becomes harder to solve due to the increasing number
of binary variables.
To overcome the abovementioned challenges, this paper
studies four computationally efficient algorithms to solve the
ADBLP for FDI attacks. We originally presented three of
these algorithms in [19], but the fourth is novel to the present
paper. These algorithms either yield the optimal attack, or
otherwise provide lower and/or upper bounds on the objective.
A lower bound highlights a specific overflow vulnerability
since it represents a feasible attack. An upper bound indicates
a severity limit of this class of attacks.
The first algorithm uses row generation [20] to model
only a subset of line limits in the second level OPF and
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yields the optimal attack. The second algorithm is more
efficient by utilizing column generation [20] to judiciously
eliminate generation limits in addition to line limits, but it
loses optimality guarantee. The third algorithm solves a linear
program (LP) maximizing the difference between target line
cyber and physical power flows, and provides both lower and
upper bounds. The fourth algorithm provides a lower bound
on the objective by utilizing Benders’ decomposition [21]
to solve the original FDI attack ADBLP instead of the re-
formulated MILP. This algorithm not only applies to our attack
optimization problem, but also applies to any ADBLP.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) Introduction of a fourth algorithm that utilizes Benders’
decomposition to evaluate vulnerability of large-scale
power systems (the other algorithms are included as a
baseline to provide fair comparison). This algorithm not
only sometimes provides the best bound, but also is
more computationally efficient compared to the first two
algorithms as the system size increases.
2) Analysis of line vulnerability that indicates which lines
are more vulnerable to the proposed attacks. This can
be used to identify specific points of vulnerability (Sec.
V-D).
3) Analysis of the impact of overall congestion on vulnera-
bility that helps the system operators better estimate the
severity of the attacks (Sec. V-E).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec.
II describes the measurement and attack model. Sec. III
summarizes prior work formulating the bi-level optimization
problem and converting it to an MILP. Sec. IV introduces
the four algorithms to find bounds on the solution of this
optimization problem. Sec. V presents the simulation results
on IEEE 118-bus system and Polish system. VI concludes the
paper and considers directions of future work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We model the power system with nb buses, nbr branches,
ng generators, and nm measurements.
A. Measurement Model
The DC measurement model is given by
z = HJx+ e (1)
where z is the nm × 1 measurement vector; x is the nb × 1
vector of bus voltage angles (states); HJ is the nm × nb
measurement Jacobian matrix; e is the nm × 1 vector of
measurement noise, whose entries are assumed to be jointly
distributed as N (0,R) where R = diag(σ21 , σ22 , . . . , σ2nm).
B. Attack Model
The attacker is assumed to have (i) the ability to perform
system-wide DCOPF; and (ii) control of measurements in a
subgraph S of the network.1
1While these assumptions may seem unrealistic, we have shown in other
work [22] that an attacker can cause comparable physical consequences with
much less system knowledge. A similar bi-level optimization problem is
introduced to evaluate power system vulnerability to more limited attackers,
and the techniques presented in this paper could be readily applied to that
problem for large systems. For simplicity, we focus on the stronger attacker
in this paper.
An nb×1 attack vector c 6= 0 is defined to be unobservable
if, in the absence of noise, the false measurement z¯ created by
the attacker satisfies z¯ = z +HJc [2]. Let xˆ be the estimated
states without attack. The residual r = z¯ − HJ(xˆ + c) =
z +HJc−HJ(xˆ+ c) = z −HJ xˆ is the same as the residual
without the attack. Therefore, this attack can bypass the DC
bad data detector (BDD).
For tractability reasons, we use DC power flow model, but
the attacks introduced in this paper can also be used to create
false data that bypass AC BDD as in [23]. Given an attack
vector c, unobservable false measurements can also be created
even if AC measurement model and AC SE are used. Under
AC measurement model z = hJ(x), false measurements
constructed as z¯ = hJ(xˆ+ c) can bypass the AC BDD.
Given an attack vector c, the attacker can launch an un-
observable attack if it controls measurements in a subgraph
S as constructed in [4]. By modifying measurements only
in S, the attacker can arbitrarily spoof the states of center
buses (load buses corresponding to non-zero entries of c)
without detection. The system operator will see the results of
this unobservable attack as load re-distributions between load
buses within S, while the total load remain unchanged.
III. WORST-CASE LINE OVERFLOW ATTACKS
The authors of [8] introduce a bi-level optimization problem
that can be re-formulated as an MILP, to determine the worst-
case unobservable line overflow attack. The first level models
the attacker’s objective and limitations, while the second level
models the system response via DCOPF. On the IEEE RTS
24-bus system, unobservable attacks found using this MILP
are shown to successfully result in generation re-dispatches
that cause line overflows.
Instead of modeling the DCOPF problem using the B-
θ method, this paper models it using the equivalent power
transfer distribution factor (PTDF) formulation. With PTDFs,
state variables θ can be eliminated by representing them as
a function of the generation dispatches PG, which simplifies
the DCOPF to have only PG as its variable. Without loss of
generality, we assume the flow on the target line is positive;
if this is not the case, its absolute value can be maximized.
We formulate the bi-level optimization problem as follows:
maximize
c
Pl − σ ‖c‖1 (2a)
subject to
P = PTDF(GBP ∗G − PD) (2b)
‖c‖1 ≤ N1 (2c)
− LSPD ≤ Hc ≤ LSPD (2d)
{P ∗G} = arg
{
min
PG
CG (PG)
}
(2e)
subject to∑ng
g=1 PGg =
∑nb
i=1 PDi (λ) (2f)
−Pmax ≤ PTDF(GBPG − PD +Hc)
≤ Pmax (F±) (2g)
PminG ≤ PG ≤ PmaxG (α±) (2h)
where the variables are:
2
c attack vector, nb × 1;
P vector of physical line power flows, nbr × 1 ;
Pl physical power flow of target line l, scalar;
PG, P
∗
G vectors of generation dispatch variables and op-
timal generation dispatch solved by DCOPF, re-
spectively, both are ng × 1 ;
λ dual variable of the load balance constraint;
F±, α± dual variable vectors of line limits and generation
limits, respectively;
and the parameters are:
LS load shift factor, in percentage;
PD vector of real loads, nb × 1;
N1 l1-norm limit, scalar;
H dependency matrix between power injection mea-
surements and states, nb × nb;
GB generators to buses connectivity matrix, nb × ng;
CG generation cost vector, ng × 1;
Pmax line limits vector, nbr × 1;
PminG , P
max
G generation limits vectors, both ng × 1;
σ penalty of the norm of attack vector c, scalar.
In (2a), the penalty factor σ is a small positive number
to limit the attack size; constraint (2b) is the physical power
flow equation; constraint (2c) models the attacker’s limited
resources. Ideally, l0-norm should be used to precisely capture
the sparsity of c, but for tractability reasons we use the l1-
norm as a proxy. Constraint (2d) limits the percentage of load
changes at each bus to avoid detection. DCOPF (2e)–(2h)
models the system response to the attack.
The following modifications can re-formulate the non-linear
problem (2) into an equivalent MILP as in [8]:
1) Introduce a slack variable s to linearize the l1-norm
constraint in (2c) as
c ≤ s, −c ≤ s,
∑
i∈Lload
si ≤ N1 (3)
where Lload is the set of load buses. This modification
simplifies the objective (2a) to
maximize
c,s
Pl − σ
∑
i∈Lload
si (4)
2) Use the KKT optimality conditions (see [24]) to replace
the second level DCOPF as constraints (2f)–(2h), and
0 = ∇ [CG(PG)] +∇(
ng∑
g=1
PGg −
nb∑
i=1
PDi) · λ
+∇ [±PTDF(GBPG − PD +Hc)− Pmax] · F±
+∇ (PG − PmaxG ) · α+ +∇
(
PminG − PG
) · α−
(5a)
0 ≤ F±, α± (5b)
0 = diag(F±) [PTDF(GBPG − PD +Hc)∓ Pmax]
(5c)
0 = diag(α+) (PG − PmaxG ) (5d)
0 = diag(α−)
(
PminG − PG
)
(5e)
where constraint (5a) is the partial gradient optimal
condition, (5b) is the dual feasibility constraint, and (5c)–
(5e) are the complementary slackness conditions.
3) Introduce binary variables δ±F , δ
±
α and a large constant M
to linearize the complementary slackness conditions as
δ±F ∈ {0, 1}nbr , δ±α ∈ {0, 1}ng (6a){
F± ≤Mδ±F
Pmax ∓ PTDF(GBPG − PD +Hc) ≤M(1− δ±F )
(6b) α
± ≤Mδ±α
PmaxG − PG ≤M(1− δ+α )
PG − PminG ≤M(1− δ−α ).
(6c)
The full problem is then converted to a single level MILP
with objective (4), and constraints (2b), (2d), (2f)–(3), (5a)–
(5b), and (6). Henceforth, we refer to this optimization prob-
lem as the original MILP with P ∗l as its optimal objective
value. As MILPs are in general NP-hard, guarantees on
polynomial time solutions cannot be provided. Furthermore,
as the system size scales, the computational burden to solve
this MILP also increases. We have found experimentally that
it fails to find a solution in a reasonable length of time on
the IEEE 118-bus system. Applying this optimization problem
directly to evaluate the vulnerability of actual systems with
thousands of buses to worst-case FDI attacks is intractable.
IV. COMPUTATIONALLY EFFICIENT ALGORITHMS TO
SOLVE ATTACK OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS
In this section, we introduce four computationally efficient
algorithms to solve the attack optimization problem on large-
scale power systems. Table I lists the key features of all four
algorithms, in addition to the original MILP.
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF FOUR PROPOSED ALGORITHMS
Algorithm ProgramType Outcome
Tractable Test
Cases
Original MILP MILP OptimalSolution IEEE 24-bus
Row Generation for Line
Limit Constraints (RG) MILP
Optimal
Solution
IEEE 24-bus,
IEEE 118-bus
Row and Column Generation
for Line and Generator Limit
Constraints (RCG)
MILP LowerBound
IEEE 24-bus,
IEEE 118-bus,
Polish
Cyber-physical-difference
Maximization (DM) LP
Lower &
Upper
Bounds
IEEE 24-bus,
IEEE 118-bus,
Polish
Modified Benders’
Decomposition for Bi-level
Programs (MBD)
Iterative
LP
Lower
Bound
IEEE 24-bus,
IEEE 118-bus,
Polish
A. Row Generation for Line Limit Constraints
Row and column generation techniques are useful in solv-
ing large-scale linear programs. For constraints of the form
Ax ≤ b, row generation retains only a subset of constraints
(rows of A), and column generation retains only a subset
of variables (columns of A). We iteratively add only those
constraints and variables that are needed [25] [26]. These tech-
niques help reduce the size of matrix A, and hence accelerate
the solving process. Similar techniques have been used by
power system operators for large-scale optimization problems,
including unit commitment and security constrained economic
3
dispatch (SCED) [27]. In our problem, these techniques allow
us to reduce the number of binary variables.
If a line is operating at very low power flow compared to
its rating, its corresponding line limit constraint is unlikely
to be active at optimal of the original MILP, and therefore,
can be removed. If the cyber power flow of a line is beyond
its limit, we say this line has cyber overflow. If there are
any post-attack cyber overflows, the line limit constraints for
those lines are added back to the attack optimization problem
(new rows generated). If this algorithm terminates, the solution
is guaranteed to be optimal (i.e. P ∗(RG)l = P
∗
l ) because no
constraints are violated.
Algorithm 1 Row generation for line limit constraints (RG)
1) Perform DCOPF for the whole system with no attack.
2) Let Q be the set of critical lines (i.e., lines operating at
over 90% of their ratings).
3) Remove the constraints corresponding to line k from (2g),
(5a)–(5b), (6a), and (6b) for all k /∈ Q.
4) Solve the reduced problem, and compute the cyber power
flow of the system using the optimal dispatch P ∗(RG)G .
5) If cyber overflows exist, add all lines with cyber overflow
to Q, and go back to 3).
6) Let P ∗(RG)l be the optimal objective value of RG.
B. Row and Column Generation for Line and Generator Limit
Constraints
RCG further reduces the number of binary variables by
reducing generator limits. Since load changes are limited by
constraint (2d), it is likely that in response to these load
changes, only a subset of all generators (denote as marginal
generators) will re-dispatch. RCG removes the generator limits
of non-marginal generators and treats their outputs as con-
stants. In addition to the re-included line limits in RG, non-
marginal generators with changed dispatch after the attack
are added to the set of marginal generators (new columns
generated). This ensures the system response to the attack
predicted by the attacker is correct.
Since it does not search the full feasible space by holding
some entries of PG as constants, RCG is not guaranteed to
yield the optimal solution for the original MILP. However, it
always provides a feasible solution, and hence, P ∗(RCG)l is a
lower bound on P ∗l .
C. Cyber-Physical-Difference Maximization
The DM algorithm maximizes the post-attack power flow
difference between physical and cyber power flows. Both
lower and upper bounds on P ∗l can be derived using DM.
Moreover, this algorithm can be applied efficiently on large
systems as it only involves solving an LP.
The following theorem proves the DM algorithm.
Theorem 1. The upper and lower bounds from the DM
algorithm satisfy
P ∗(DM,lb)l ≤ P ∗l ≤ P ∗(DM,ub)l . (10)
Moreover, if the post-attack cyber power flow of the target line
is at its limit, then P ∗(DM,ub)l = P
∗(DM,lb)
l = P
∗
l .
Algorithm 2 Row and column generation for line and gener-
ator limit constraints (RCG)
1) Perform DCOPF for the whole system with no attack.
2) Let Q be the set of critical lines as defined in RG.
3) Let R be the set of generators g where PminGg < PGg <
PmaxGg .
4) Remove the constraints corresponding to line k and
generator g from (2g)–(2h), (5a) and (6a)–(6c) for all
k /∈ Q and all g /∈ R.
5) Solve the reduced problem to find the resulting generation
dispatch P ∗(RCG)G and optimal attack vector c
∗
RCG.
6) Use c∗RCG to run post-attack DCOPF (2e)–(2h) to find
system operator’s corresponding dispatch P postG .
7) For all g that P ∗(RCG)Gg 6= P postGg , if they belong to R, go
to 8); Otherwise add them to R and go back to 4).
8) Use P ∗(RCG)G to calculate the cyber power flows.
9) If cyber overflows exist, add all lines with cyber overflow
to Q, and go back to 4).
10) Let P ∗(RCG)l be the optimal objective value of RCG.
Algorithm 3 Cyber-physical-difference maximization (DM)
1) Solve the following optimization problem and let c∗DM be
the optimal solution.
maximize
c,s
− PTDFl(Hc) (7)
subject to (2b), (2d), (3).
2) Obtain the upper bound:
P
∗(DM,ub)
l := P
max
l − PTDFl(Hc∗DM) (8)
where PTDFl is the lth row of the PTDF matrix.
3) Perform post-attack DCOPF (2e)–(2h) with c = c∗DM to
find post-attack dispatch P postG .
4) Obtain the lower bound:
P
∗(DM,lb)
l := PTDFl(GBP
post
G − PD). (9)
Proof. The post-attack physical power flow on target line l is
given by
P physicall = PTDFl(GBP
post
G − PD). (11)
This is a feasible solution, and hence, is a lower bound on P ∗l .
Given an attack vector c, the post-attack cyber power flow on
l is given by
P cyberl = PTDFl(GBP
post
G − PD +Hc)
= P physicall + PTDFl(Hc). (12)
Since the cyber power flow cannot exceed its limit,
P cyberl = P
physical
l + PTDFl(Hc) ≤ Pmaxl . (13)
Thus, we have
P physicall ≤ Pmaxl − PTDFl(Hc). (14)
Therefore, since the optimization problem in (7) maximizes the
second term in (14), P ∗(DM,ub)l as computed in (8) is an upper
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bound on P ∗l . If P
cyber
l = P
max
l , substituting this relationship
into (11) and (12) proves P ∗(DM,ub)l = P
∗(DM,lb)
l = P
∗
l .
D. Modified Benders’ Decomposition for Attacker-Defender
Bi-level Linear Programs
In this section, we introduce the MBD algorithm to solve
ADBLPs. Benders’ decomposition [21] can be utilized to solve
a linear program with complicating variables in a distributed
manner at the cost of iteration [28]. It is a popular technique to
solve optimization problems of large size or with complicating
variables. It is also effective in solving complex optimization
problems such as stochastic programs and mixed-integer linear
programs. In Benders’ decomposition, an optimization prob-
lem is decomposed into two sub-problems, wherein variables
of each sub-problem are treated as constant in the other.
The two sub-problems are solved iteratively until the solution
converges. The MBD algorithm is formed by modifying the
classic Benders’ decomposition algorithm to apply it on any
ADBLP without converting it into an MILP.
An ADBLP takes the following form (dual variables of the
defender’s problem are in parentheses):
minimize
x,y∗
cT1 x+ d
T
1 y
∗ (15a)
subject to
A1x ≥ b1 (15b)
y∗ = arg{min
y
dT2 y} (15c)
subject to
A2x+A3y ≥ b2 (β) (15d)
where x and y are the attacker’s and defender’s decision
variables, respectively. The defender has no control on x, and
hence, x in (15d) is treated as constant in the defender’s
problem. The attacker does not directly control y, but it
controls y∗ by changing x, assuming it has knowledge of the
defender’s objective and constraints.
The original attack optimization problem (2) fits in the
form of (15) where the attack vector c is represented by x
and the generation dispatch PG is represented by y. In the
attacker’s objective function, cT1 x represents the term −σ ‖c‖1,
and dT1 y
∗ represents the term Pl in (2a). Equality constraints
can be equivalently written as two inequality constraints. For
example, (2f) can be written as
1TPG ≥ 1TPD (16a)
−1TPG ≥ −1TPD (16b)
which fits the form of (15d). One can similarly map all the
constraints in (2) to those in (15).
The defender’s problem (15c)–(15d), which represents the
system response (DCOPF) to a fixed attack vector, has the
following dual problem (note that x is treated as constant here
since it is the fixed attack vector from the attacker’s problem):
maximize
β
βT (b2 −A2x∗) (17a)
subject to AT3 β = d2 (17b)
β ≥ 0. (17c)
By weak duality [24], for any feasible primal/dual pair, the
dual objective value is always less than the primal one:
βT (b2 −A2x∗) ≤ dT2 y. (18)
Since the defender’s problem is a linear program, it satisfies
strong duality. That is, any feasible point (y, β) that satisfies
βT (b2 −A2x∗) ≥ dT2 y (19)
is an optimal solution to it. Therefore, constraints (15d), (17b),
(17c), and (19) guarantee the optimality of the defender’s
problem, and hence, can be used to convert the ADBLP to
a single level problem as:
minimize
x,y,β
cT1 x+ d
T
1 y (20a)
subject to A1x ≥ b1 (20b)
A2x+A3y ≥ b2 (20c)
AT3 β = d2 (20d)
βT b2 − βTA2x− dT2 y ≥ 0 (20e)
β ≥ 0. (20f)
The bilinear term βTA2x in (20e) is non-convex and hard
to solve. To overcome this difficulty, Benders’ decomposition
is utilized to decompose this optimization problem into two
problems, with x as the variable for the master problem (MP)
and y, β as the variables for the slave problem (SP). The MP
takes the following form:
minimize
x,α
cT1 x+ α (21a)
subject to A1x ≥ b1 (21b)
where α is a variable introduced to represent dT1 y
∗, which will
then be updated by adding cuts. The SP takes the following
form:
minimize
y,β
dT1 y (22a)
subject to βT b2 − dT2 y − βTA2x∗ ≥ 0 (δ) (22b)
A3y ≥ b2 −A2x∗ (γ) (22c)
AT3 β = d2 (λ) (22d)
β ≥ 0. (22e)
At the optimal solution of the SP given by (22), we have
dT1 y
∗ = γT b2 + λT d2 − γTA2x∗. (23)
An optimality cut can be added to the MP by taking the right
hand side of (23) and replacing x∗ with x:
α ≥ γT b2 + λT d2 − γTA2x. (24)
Note that if the SP is infeasible with a given x∗, a feasibility
cut is added to the MP instead:
0 ≥ γT b2 + λT d2 − γTA2x. (25)
The MP and SP can then be solved iteratively, with the MP
updating x∗ and the SP updating cuts in each iteration.
Solving the SP is equivalent to solving the second level
DCOPF under attack (2e)−(2h), while the dual variables of the
SP provide information on the objective function (2a). Since
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Algorithm 4 Modified Benders’ Decomposition for Bi-level
Linear Programs (MBD)
1) Set the iteration number k = 1 and let x∗(0) = 0.
2) Solve the SP (22) with x∗(k−1).
3) If the SP is infeasible, add a feasibility cut of form (25) to
the MP. Otherwise, add an optimality cut of form (24) to
the MP, and obtain the solution to the SP (y∗(k), β∗(k)).
4) Solve the MP with added cuts and obtain the solution
(x∗(k), α∗(k)).
5) If dT1 y
∗(k)−α∗(k) < , stop. The optimal objective value
is obtained as cT1 x
∗(k)+dT1 y
∗(k). Otherwise, let k = k+1
and go to step 2).
each cut is formulated linearly on the x domain, adding cuts to
the MP does not affect its convexity. Thus, MBD is guaranteed
to converge in a finite number of iterations [29]. However,
due to the non-convexity of the original bi-level optimization
problem, MBD is not guaranteed to give the global optimal
solution [30]. Therefore, P ∗(MBD)l , the optimal objective value
obtained by MBD, is a lower bound on P ∗l .
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results using the
algorithms described in Sec. IV. Two test systems are used,
namely the IEEE 118-bus system and the Polish system.
Before attack, the IEEE 118-bus system and the Polish system
have 7 and 17 critical lines, and 15 and 6 marginal generators,
respectively. We exhaustively target all critical lines to assess
the vulnerability of these two systems. The l1-norm limit N1
is chosen with increment 0.1 in the range [0.1, 1] for the 118-
bus system, and [0.1, 2] for the Polish system. Throughout,
Matlab, Matpower, and the Gurobi solver are used to perform
the simulations. All tests are conducted using a 3.40 GHz PC
with 32 GB RAM.
A. Computational Efficiency
The decrease in the number of binary variables characterizes
the computational efficiency improved by RG and RCG. Table
II illustrates a comparison of the average number of binary
variables when applying the original MILP, RG, and RCG.
Since we are unable to verify the convergence of RG for the
Polish system, the number of binary variables on RG for this
system is an estimate. This table demonstrates that both RG
and RCG can greatly reduce the number of binary variables
compared to the original MILP, and therefore significantly
improve the computational efficiency. Table III illustrates the
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF BINARY VARIABLES
Test System Original MILP RG RCG
118-Bus 480 122 45
Polish 6446 688 87
statistics of the computation time for several target lines using
the proposed algorithms with 10% load shift. For each target
line, each algorithm is tested for the full range of N1 values
stated above. We note that RCG is more efficient than RG since
it requires fewer binary variables. DM is the most efficient
algorithm as it only involves solving an LP. Note that the
number of iterations for MBD varies for different parameter
choices (target line, N1, and LS), resulting in a large variation
in computation time.
TABLE III
STATISTICS OF COMPUTATION TIME WITH 10% LOAD SHIFT
Target line Algorithm Max (s) Min (s) Avg (s) Med (s)
37 of 118-bus
RG 7.53 0.95 3.33 1.9
RCG 1.25 0.34 0.76 0.69
DM 0.5 0.43 0.47 0.45
MBD 1.88 1.57 1.63 1.59
24 of Polish
RCG 46.36 3.40 20.39 13.67
DM 15.75 1.91 8.09 8.58
MBD 12.26 10.46 11.40 11.58
292 of Polish
RCG 76.34 27.47 39.29 33.69
DM 16.77 1.91 7.02 6.10
MBD 1846.2 9.86 358.73 10.31
B. Results on Maximal Physical Power Flows
Fig. 1 illustrates the maximal physical power flows with
LS = 10% on target lines 104 and 141 of the IEEE 118-bus
system. It demonstrates a comparison of the bounds found by
RCG, DM and MBD to the optimal solution provided by RG.
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Fig. 1. The maximal power flow vs. the l1-norm constraint (N1) with target
line (a) 104, and (b) 141 of IEEE 118-bus system. LS=10%.
Note that for target line 104 with any N1, all four algorithms
yield the optimal solution. For target line 141, we see that
P
∗(MBD)
l < P
∗(DM,lb)
l < P
∗(RG)
l = P
∗(RCG)
l < P
∗(DM,ub)
l ,
illustrating that P ∗(DM,lb)l and P
∗(DM,ub)
l are not always tight
bounds on P ∗l . RCG provides the optimal solution for all target
lines we have considered in the 118-bus system.
The maximal power flows with 10% load shift for target
lines 292, 24, and 1816 of the Polish system are illustrated in
Fig. 2. Note that RG is intractable on the Polish system. For
target line 292, all three algorithms yield the optimal solution
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in the range N1 ∈ [0.1, 1.6], i.e., P ∗(DM,ub)l = P ∗(DM,lb)l =
P
∗(RCG)
l = P
∗(MBD)
l , but not for the remaining N1. For target
line 24, MBD yields the tightest lower bound; while for target
line 1816, DM provides the tightest lower bound.
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Fig. 2. The maximal power flow vs. the l1-norm constraint (N1) with target
line (a) 292, (b) 24, and (c) 1816 of the Polish system. LS=10%.
C. Results on Attack Resources
Fig. 3 illustrates the relationship between maximal power
flow and l0-norm of the attack vector (i.e. the number of
center buses in the attack) versus the l1-norm constraint N1
for target line 292 of the Polish system, with different load
shift constraints. As N1 increases, so does the l0-norm of the
attack, indicating that l1-norm is a valid proxy for l0-norm
for our problem. If a larger load shift is allowed, the maximal
power flow on target line increases, but the resulting l0-norm
decreases. This indicates a trade-off between load shift and
attacker’s resources: as the attacker attempts to avoid detection
by minimizing load changes, it will require control over a
larger portion of the system to launch a comparable attack.
Similar results are also obtained on the IEEE 118-bus system.
D. Line vulnerability
Since the objective of the attack is to maximize the physical
power flow on a target line, it is intuitive that congested lines
are more vulnerable to this attack. We have found experimen-
tally that almost every congested line can be overloaded. One
exception is line 176 in the IEEE 118-bus system. This is
because line 176 is a radial line: it is the only line connected
to a bus with a generator and no load. The line limit constraint
in the OPF (2g) ensures that no possible dispatch could cause
the line power flow to exceed the limit, even if based on
counterfeit loads. In fact, any line with this radial configuration
is immune to the proposed attack; moreover, these radial lines
represent the only exceptions to our finding that congested
lines can be overloaded. We have also found that lines that are
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Fig. 3. (a) The maximal power flow and (b) l0-norm of the attack vector
vs. the l1-norm constraint (N1) for target line 292 of the Polish system with
different load shift.
not congested pre-attack may still be vulnerable to this attack,
such as line 141 in the IEEE 118-bus system (Fig.1(b)) and
line 2110 in the Polish system (Fig. 4).
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Fig. 4. The maximal power flow vs. the l1-norm constraint (N1) for target
line 2110 of the Polish system. LS=10%.
E. Impact of Overall Congestion on Vulnerability
In the above, we have shown that virtually all critical or
congested lines are vulnerable to overload. However, the extent
of the vulnerability depends on several factors, such as the
overall congestion of the system. This phenomenon is illus-
trated in Fig. 5, which shows the worst-case attack for line 292
of the Polish system under different overall congestion levels.
This overall congestion is adjusted by uniformly changing
the line ratings for all lines. Note that higher line ratings
mean a less congested system. As shown in Fig. 5, as the
overall congestion level increases, the maximal power flow on
the target line also increases, even though the line is equally
congested before attack in each case.
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Fig. 5. The maximal power flow vs. the l1-norm constraint (N1) for target
line 292 of the Polish system under different congestion levels. LS=10%.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Four computationally efficient algorithms are introduced
to evaluate the vulnerability of large-scale power systems to
FDI attacks. Cyber-physical difference maximization (DM)
can provide an upper bound of the severity of the attacks.
Row generation (RG) and row and column generation (RCG)
reduce the number of binary variables according to the number
of critical lines and marginal generators. As the system size
increases, the number of critical lines and marginal generators
also increases. Thus, there may still be a large number of
binary variables in RG and RCG, making the attack opti-
mization problem hard to solve in real time. However, MBD
can still be applied efficiently since it only involves solving
linear programs, making it more powerful in assessing large-
scale system vulnerabilities. Furthermore, MBD can be easily
applied to any attacker-defender bi-level linear programs. It
has the flexibility to evaluate system vulnerability even with
additional constraints such as ramp rate constraints, security
constraints, and reserve constraints that are common in modern
power system operations. Making use of these algorithms, we
have also found that all critical lines are vulnerable to the
proposed attacks, with the exception of radial lines with a
specific configuration. Moreover, systems with higher overall
congestion are more vulnerable.
Our proposed vulnerability assessment algorithms can be
helpful in making the system more resilient in the following
ways. Using this analysis, the system operators can identify
specific lines of vulnerability, and the severity of the attacks.
Certain preventive actions can be taken to prevent successful
attacks. For example, if the system operators find that a
line can have overflow under attack, they could artificially
reduce the line limit to keep the attack from being successful.
Measurements around vulnerable lines can be encrypted to
prevent them from being modified. In our optimization prob-
lem, the load shift constraint characterizes the detectability of
the attack, indicating that load abnormally detectors can help
system operators distinguish between natural load changes and
possible cyber attacks based on load redistribution.
Future work will include modeling security constraints in
the OPF formulation subsequent to an attack, as well as
designing countermeasures to detect and thwart such attacks.
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